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Situating Chinese Architecture within 
“A Century of Progress”: The Chinese Pavilion, 
the Bendix Golden Temple, and the 1933 
Chicago World’s Fair
Long considered a notable event in American modern architectural history, the 1933 Chicago World’s Fair should also be remembered as a consequential, 
if unexplored, episode in Republican China’s tentative 
embrace of modern architecture.1 Organized in response to 
concerns over the applicability of European-originated 
design innovations in the United States, the primary objec-
tive of the Chicago World’s Fair was both to redefine and to 
promote a new modern architectural idiom “not only in 
America but in the world at large.”2 For the young Chinese 
nation, founded in January 1912, after the fall of the Qing 
dynasty, as well as its ruling Guomindang (GMD) party, 
which gained political control over China in 1927, the expo-
sition seemed to offer much more: namely, an invaluable 
opportunity to present China to an international audience as 
a modern nation-state equal to other countries of the world. 
Roughly three years after accepting an invitation to 
 participate in the fair, however, China, then struggling to 
resist Japanese occupation and hampered by its increasingly 
fragmented political leadership, withdrew its official com-
mitment to the fair and found itself represented by two 
 nongovernmentally funded structures. One was a hastily 
constructed Chinese courtyard–style pavilion financed by 
a group of Shanghai businessmen and designed through 
the collaborative efforts of an American and a Chinese archi-
tect. The other was a piece-by-piece reconstruction of an 
 eighteenth-century Tibetan Buddhist shrine, the Golden 
Temple of Jehol, sponsored by the Chicago industrialist 
 Vincent Bendix (Figures 1 and 2). Neither building has 
received any critical scholarly attention.3 The history of China’s 
unofficial architectural representation in Chicago, however, 
remains compelling for several reasons. 
International expositions figured as important factors 
in shaping Chinese conceptualizations of internationalism 
relative to its own modern architectural representation over 
the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Translated as wanguo bolanhui, or “ten thousand nations’ 
exhibitions,” such events connoted a kind of coerced multi-
lateral engagement that, like the country’s forced opening to 
foreign commercial expansion in 1842, was construed to 
constitute the origins of Chinese modernization and the 
country’s own modern approach to architectural develop-
ment.4 Although Qing China was officially involved in at 
least twenty-five international exhibitions between 1867 and 
1904, responsibility for the design and content selection of 
China’s displays fell to a handful of foreign officials employed 
by the country’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service based 
in Shanghai. The result was an accumulation of architecture, 
images, and objects selected by expatriates that reinforced 
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foreign impressions of “China” as precious, fragile, and 
hopelessly antiquated, while obscuring the dramatic indus-
trial, political, and social transformations roiling the country 
at the time. Nevertheless, it was through participation in 
such events that Chinese observers began to understand how 
architecture was used by Euro-American nations to deter-
mine a country’s “level of civilization” in the construction of 
what Rebecca Karl has described as the “structured totality” 
of a Western-centric modern world.5 
The Republican government’s decision to participate in 
San Francisco’s 1915 Panama-Pacific International Exhibi-
tion signaled its sensitivity to the symbolic forms of engage-
ment required of modern statehood. The Chinese pavilion 
grounds, which were anchored by a simplified, scaled replica 
Figure 1  Chinese Pavilion, Century of 
Progress International Exposition, 
Chicago, 1933 (Kaufmann & Fabry Co., 
Chicago [photographer], ca. 1933. HALIC, 
Ryerson and Burnham Archives, Art 
Institute of Chicago. Digital File #47457 
copyright Art Institute of Chicago).
Figure 2  The Bendix Golden Temple, 
Chicago, 1933–34 (Special Collections 
Research Center, University of Chicago 
Library).
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of the Forbidden City’s Hall of Supreme Harmony flanked 
by two teahouses for public concessions, were met with a 
mixed international response (Figure 3). At least one Western 
editorial applauded the “modern” and “democratic” decision 
made by the Chinese government in reappropriating one 
of the Qing dynasty’s most sacred political monuments for 
the purposes of widespread public consumption. Chinese 
American observers, by contrast, found the display “extremely 
inferior” and “shameful” and its workmanship, undertaken by 
Chinese carpenters sent to San Francisco for the occasion, 
“entirely insufficient to represent China’s progress.”6 Such 
equivocality portended the Republican government’s chal-
lenges in rendering new, national aspirations legible to an 
international audience. China’s acculturation vis-à-vis  modern, 
globally resonant architectural expression subsequently reg-
istered in its state-supported Beaux-Arts-inspired domestic 
building and planning program instituted over the course 
of the Republican government’s most stable period of rule, 
an era generally known as the Nanjing decade (1927–37). 
In major GMD-controlled cities, such as Guangzhou, 
Shanghai, and the country’s new capital, Nanjing, govern-
ment officials, a handful of well-respected foreign advisers, 
and several of China’s first foreign-trained architects, many 
of whom studied École des Beaux-Arts-guided curricula in 
the United States and Europe, collectively began to promote 
the intertwining of Western design principles and new build-
ing materials with imperial-era ornamental motifs and com-
positional strategies such as ceremonial axes, decorative 
bracket sets, and sloping roof structures in the construction 
of political and cultural monuments described at the time as 
both modern and distinctively Chinese (Figure 4).7 Their 
collective identification at the time as “modern” Chinese 
architecture was derived not merely from the universal leg-
ibility of their forms or the new materials employed in their 
Figure 3  Chinese Pavilion, Panama-
Pacific International Exposition, San 
Francisco, 1915 (San Francisco History 
Center, San Francisco Public Library).
Figure 4  Dong Dayou, Mayor’s Office, 
Greater Shanghai Plan, 1929–33 (China 
Critic 10 [Aug. 1935]).
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construction but, as Lai Delin has observed, from their status 
as international projects realized through the country’s first 
globally publicized competitions, which in themselves sym-
bolized the Republican government’s continued efforts to 
achieve universal recognition as a modern nation-state.8 
China’s involvement in the Chicago World’s Fair spanned 
a period between 1931 and 1934, when Chinese impressions 
of modern architecture, and, by extension, international 
architecture, began to change. One widely recognized cata-
lyst was the 1933 arrival in Shanghai of news of a seminal 
Museum of Modern Art exhibition in New York. “The Inter-
national Style,” alternatively translated as wanguo shi (“ten 
thousand nations’ style”) or guoji shi (“international style”), 
helped bring the collective attention of China’s architectural 
community to the idea of architecture without historical 
or traditional precedent.9 The Chicago World’s Fair also 
needs to be seen as playing an equally critical role in shap-
ing subsequent Chinese reaction to the new style, its foreign 
origins, and its impact upon China’s sense of architectural 
autonomy, particularly given the ideological milieu of 
Republican China. Understanding the Chinese experience 
at Chicago as an influential intersection between early 
 twentieth-century Chinese architectural discourse, the modern 
movement, and international exhibitionary paradigms com-
plicates conventional narratives of the Republican govern-
ment’s official building program and its resolute focus upon 
domestic Beaux-Arts-inspired architectural expression.10 
The realization of a pair of Chinese structures ostensibly 
designed and temporarily constructed on foreign soil by pro-
fessional Chinese architects and craftsmen for a predomi-
nantly American audience suggests the presence of a different 
and more complex transnational vector in China’s architec-
tural history. The circumstances by which China was eventu-
ally represented at the fair raises important questions 
concerning the rhetoric of authenticity and modern Chinese 
architecture, the role played by international architectural 
exchange in this relationship, the political and technological 
mechanisms through which such interchanges often operate, 
and the range of cultural and national anxieties these vectors 
tend to effect. Examination of the unofficial Chinese pavilion 
together with the Bendix Golden Temple illuminates a tran-
sitional moment in the country’s approach to modern archi-
tecture in relation to the formation of a modern Chinese 
nation-state and its cultural self-representation.
The Bendix Golden Temple
The 1933 Chicago World’s Fair became a venue for its 
American organizers to promote their nation’s own version 
of “modern” architecture to counter European cultural 
dominance and the formidable avant-garde precedents 
established by expositions in Europe, such as the 1925 Expo-
sition des Arts Décoratifs in Paris as well as the recently 
 concluded 1929 Barcelona International Exposition.11 
 Promotional literature promised that Chicago would “show 
the world not what has happened in the past … but what is 
being done in the present, and what may happen in the 
future,” while internal fair correspondence clarified that, 
although each of the event’s major thematic pavilions would 
be designed by its architectural committee using the latest 
structural and technological advancements, use of the term 
“modern” as it pertained to the individual national pavilions 
was based not necessarily on modern architectural trends of 
the time, per se, but on broader notions of commercial and 
industrial progress relative to past world’s fairs.12 Foreign 
participants were assured that Chicago’s architectural com-
mittee would not “tell our friends representing other govern-
ments what their exhibitions shall be”; rather, they were 
instead encouraged to create an “attractive” display with 
information concerning “the manner in which other people 
live and meet the daily problems of existence.”13 
Radical experimentation with a modern architecture 
unburdened by the past presented an aesthetic and political 
challenge to the Republican Chinese government’s preexist-
ing public building program. However, Chicago’s inclusive, 
broadly progressive theme resonated with Republican offi-
cials’ eagerness to promote the country’s political and eco-
nomic development abroad. In weighing their decision to 
participate, GMD representatives noted the “great differ-
ence” between previous fairs and the Chicago exhibition’s 
stated goal to “[bring] about a world at peace, in good order, 
in full international co-operation for the advancement of 
knowledge and the promotion of trade and industry … with-
out any nationality, being opened, as it were, by the world 
and for the world.”14 That the Beaux-Arts-trained Paul 
Philippe Cret (1876–1945), a patriarchal figure in the educa-
tion of many of China’s young architectural elite at the 
 University of Pennsylvania and published skeptic of what 
he termed “the so-called ‘modernist trend,’ ” was named the 
fair’s architectural committee chair also likely eased any lin-
gering apprehension on the part of Chinese representatives 
concerning their country’s ability to meet the fair’s architec-
tural requirements.15 
Just over four months after China agreed to participate, 
however, Japan invaded Manchuria on 18 September 1931.16 
Despite the series of political and diplomatic crises triggered 
by the event, China’s State Council declared in December 
the nation’s intention to attend the fair in Chicago, appro-
priating $62,000 for any costs incurred therein.17 This sup-
port was followed by renewed Sino-Japanese armed conflict 
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outside Shanghai in January 1932 and Japan’s establishment 
of the independent Republic of Manchukuo that March, 
prompting doubt among fair organizers as to whether war 
would hinder China’s logistical ability to organize and 
finance its own pavilion. 
American fair organizers subsequently began to explore 
the possibility of an alternatively funded Chinese pavilion 
capable of eliciting tacit Republican government approval. 
In February 1932, fair trustees accepted the offer of Vincent 
Bendix, a well-known Chicago industrialist and fellow 
trustee, to include in the exhibition his own recently acquired 
Bendix Golden Temple, a replica of the Wanfaguiyi Hall of 
Jehol originally constructed between 1767 and 1771 at the 
request of the Emperor Qianlong, northeast of Beijing in 
the former Qing summer retreat of Chengde (Figures 5, 6, 
and 7).18 Nestled within the thick outer walls of Chengde’s 
Putuozongcheng Temple complex and obscured from out-
siders, the original pavilion formed part of a larger, reimag-
ined construction of the Potala Palace in Tibet. Although the 
buildings were commissioned on the occasion of the 
 Qianlong emperor’s sixtieth and his mother’s eightieth birth-
day, their completion also coincided with the return of the 
Torghut tribe to Qing China from the Volga River valley. 
The complex’s ostensibly Tibetan façade masks a basic Han 
Chinese–style temple layout comprising a central organizing 
axis anchored by the Wanfaguiyi Hall. Such cross-cultural 
synthesis, as both Anne Chayet and Patricia Berger have 
noted, aimed at encapsulating the expansive scope and rich 
diversity of the Qing imperial domain.19 In Chicago, the 
temple would emerge temporarily as China’s lone, de facto 
architectural entry, filling the void left by the Republican 
government’s still tentative commitment and exposing the 
range of curatorial, financial, and geopolitical obstacles to 
China’s efforts to represent itself as well as the lack of con-
sensus, both within China and abroad, as to what constituted 
a modern yet Chinese architectural aesthetic. 
Bendix’s interest in the temple had initially been sparked 
in the summer of 1929 by Dr. Sven Hedin, the world- 
renowned Swedish explorer, geographer, and Sinologist, 
who had sought out the wealthy Swedish American business-
man in the hope that he might be willing to fund an expedi-
tion to purchase a Buddhist temple in China and reconstruct 
it on foreign soil. Believing China’s Tibetan Buddhist heri-
tage was at particular risk of “total extinction” in the face 
of growing Chinese political instability, Hedin eventually 
persuaded Bendix to bankroll the acquisition of two temples 
as well as a varied collection of Lamaistic objects to be dis-
played within them, one of which would be constructed in 
Stockholm and the other in Chicago’s Lincoln Park.20 
Following Hedin’s return to Beijing that November, 
however, negotiations concerning the potential search for 
and purchase of temples proved difficult, particularly given 
increasingly fractured relations between Chiang Kai-shek, 
commander in chief of the National Revolutionary Army, 
and other regional leaders.21 The delay forced Hedin to 
reconsider the cultural and political ramifications of the 
 project, and it was ultimately decided to commission two 
replicas of the Golden Temple in Chengde, the logistics of 
Figure 5  Putuozongcheng Temple, Chengde, 1767–71; the Wanfaguiyi Hall’s roof can be seen extending just beyond the top of the uppermost part 
of the complex (Sven Hedin Foundation, Museum of Ethnography, Stockholm, Sweden). 
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Figure 6  Putuozongcheng Temple and Wanfaguiyi Hall, elevational section (George Staunton et al., An Authentic Account of an Embassy from the 
King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China, 1799; University of Hong Kong Libraries).
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which would be overseen by Liang Weihua, a Chinese archi-
tect who had worked with the German-born architect 
 Conrad Anner on the recently completed National Library 
in Beijing.22 Hedin and his team, comprising Liang as well as 
the Swedish ethnographer Montell Gosta, eventually arrived 
in Chengde in June 1930. There they found the temple in 
significant disrepair and reportedly in imminent risk of 
 collapse.23 The complexities involved in producing two 
reproductions quickly proved too challenging, and during 
the winter of 1930–31, seventy workmen in Beijing set about 
measuring and cutting the various components for one 
 replica, which was eventually shipped to Chicago in March 
1931. 
First documented and drawn by George Staunton as 
part of the 1793 expedition of the first British envoy to 
China, George Macartney, both the original structure and its 
replica consist of roughly 28,000 individual components, 
measure 70 feet wide and 60 feet high, and sit atop an 
approximately 4-foot-high stone terrace. The symmetrical 
square floor plan is bound by twenty-eight round columns 
that support the lower section of its double-hipped roof; 
twenty columns are embedded in the structure’s exterior 
wall, with twelve columns, each 36 feet high, supporting its 
upper roof, which is covered with 25,000 gold-gilded copper 
tiles. Reconstruction plans in Chicago stalled for one year 
before discussions between fair officials and Bendix led to 
the replica’s eventual completion at the World’s Fair in 
 September 1932 just south of Soldier Field by a team of 
 Chinese laborers and American contractors led by Guo Yuanxi 
(1904–2005), a young Chinese-born, American- educated 
architect, and the fair’s chief construction supervisor, Donald 
Boothby (Figure 8).24 
The Temple in Chicago
In some respects, the Wanfaguiyi Hall’s replication and 
reconstruction amid Chinese uncertainty with respect to its 
official participation mirrored the dynamics of China’s earlier 
exhibition experiences, whereby key curatorial decisions 
concerning China’s artistic and architectural displays had 
been made by Qing-appointed foreign representatives. As 
at prior fairs, China seemed to find itself again relegated to 
a culturally and technologically subordinate status as an 
 antiquated, Orientalized spectacle in relation to the “modern 
representational order” on display at Chicago.25 The irony 
of the Bendix Golden Temple’s status as a copy of a Qing 
replica of Tibetan Buddhist architecture did not register 
among fair officials, who instead sought to marry public 
demand for the raw exoticism of past fairs with the fair’s own 
pseudoscientific message of technological advancement by 
promoting the building as an authentic and precise example 
of architectural mimicry. The structure was immediately 
Figure 7  Bendix Golden Temple, floor plan (Sven Hedin Foundation, 
Museum of Ethnography, Stockholm, Sweden).
Figure 8  Guo Yuanxi (right) and an unidentified Chinese laborer, 
Chicago, 1932 (COP-17_0009_00291_002, University of Illinois at 
Chicago Library, Special Collections).
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lauded by the American press as an “exact replica” of the 
Lama Temple, “a perfect example of the finest in Chinese art,” 
and a classic example of “Lama Chinese architecture.”26 
Indeed, the Bendix Golden Temple represented the most 
accurate Chinese architectural reproduction yet attempted 
on foreign soil. Still, the acclaim belied an inevitable series 
of ornamental and material inconsistencies that arose not 
only between the original and the copy but also between the 
copy’s interior and its exterior.27 The decision to wire the 
Chicago replica for electric lighting, for example, drastically 
diminished the phenomenological impact Hedin had 
described as the “mystic gloom through which rise the twelve 
tall columns that support the upper roof.” Yet artificial light-
ing was deemed necessary to highlight the temple’s interior 
display, which was festooned with an assorted collection of 
objects procured by Hedin: sculpture, furniture, textiles, a 
temple bell, and a prayer wheel, all artfully arranged around 
a representation of the bodhisattva Guanyin (Figure 9).28 
Beyond fulfilling American imaginings of China’s 
 architectural essence, increasing slippage in the terminology 
used by the fair’s promotional literature, which alternately 
described the Golden Temple as both a temple and a pavilion 
constructed by “the Chinese,” confused facts concerning 
who was responsible for the building’s construction while 
tacitly promoting the building as an adequate stand-in for 
China in the absence of the country’s official involvement.29 
This differentiated the building from the exposition’s other 
ostensibly ethnic and culturally themed international attrac-
tions, including an “Old English” village, a Belgian village, an 
exhibit titled the “Streets of Paris,” the “Old Heidelberg Inn,” 
Figure 9  Interior, Bendix Golden Temple, 
Chicago, 1933 (Allen D. Albert, Official 
View Book: A Century of Progress 
Exposition [Chicago: Reuben H. Donnelley 
Corporation, 1933]).
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an “Oriental” village, as well as a replica of a Mayan Temple, 
in which there existed clear distinctions in display content and 
program as compared to their equivalent national pavilions.30 
The misidentification of the Golden Temple as a pavilion 
featured in an international event devoted to modern indus-
trial and technological progress, by contrast, implied a lack 
of architectural or cultural achievement in China since the 
eighteenth century while accentuating “the ultra-modern 
buildings” emblematic of America’s growing international 
technological hegemony (Figure 10).31 
At the same time, key distinctions help to reposition 
the Golden Temple as a product, if not necessarily of a 
 fundamentally new power dynamic at work in Chinese 
international architectural engagement, then of new shifts in 
the degree and nature of Chinese participation. The manner 
by which the Golden Temple was identified, measured, docu-
mented, and eventually reconstructed in Chicago, for exam-
ple, represented an unparalleled undertaking with respect to 
Qing architectural form, and an endeavor whose exacting 
attention to detail went far beyond the impressionistic con-
structions attempted at earlier world’s fairs. In its careful, 
empirical attention to the original building’s tectonic and spatial 
dimensions, the Bendix reconstruction constituted a new, 
more ambitious reengagement with Chinese architectural 
Figure 10 Nash automobile advertisement 
featuring the Bendix Golden Temple, 1933 
(Saturday Evening Post, 25 Mar. 1933; 
Widener Library, Harvard College Library, 
P338.7F [V. 205, 1933]).
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history than ever before undertaken. The involvement of 
Chinese observers such as Guo brought Chinese attention 
to the ways in which notions of authenticity shaped foreign 
impressions of China and their implications for Chinese 
architectural development in relation to Republican Chinese 
nation making. The extent to which the project was coordi-
nated with the help of two professionally trained Chinese 
architects based in Beijing and Chicago, with additional 
assistance provided by academics in China as well as Europe, 
also offered a cross-cultural collaborative model not witnessed 
in past Western engagements with Chinese architecture. 
The scale, scope, and complexity of the endeavor caught the 
immediate attention of a rapidly expanding and increasingly 
engaged Chinese architectural community.32 In September 
1931, floor and ceiling plans and elevation drawings of the 
original temple, photographs of the original reconstruction 
and of a scaled model, complete documentation of the pro-
portions of each structural component and their material 
composition, and the complete contract for the temple rep-
lica, were featured in the Bulletin of the Society for Research in 
Chinese Architecture.33 For all of the meticulous architectural 
detail generated by this work, however, little attention was 
paid to the structure’s convoluted multiethnic genesis, in part 
because of the lack of available information concerning its 
provenance.34 Instead, the endeavor’s elaborate and extensive 
cataloguing, the results of which had never before been 
 published by a Chinese journal, was broadly celebrated for 
bringing imperial-era construction practices to widespread 
professional attention. 
The emphasis placed on the structure’s tectonics, and its 
seemingly incongruous inclusion within a fair devoted to 
modern architecture, touched upon a number of major 
themes being raised within China’s architectural circles at 
the time regarding traditional Chinese architecture and its 
perceived relevance to Republican China’s national develop-
ment; for example, Hedin and Liang’s structural report 
echoed in the Society for Research in Chinese Architecture’s 
own celebrated field studies, which would be launched 
seven months later, in the spring of 1932.35 In March 1932, 
Lin Huiyin (1904–55), a University of Pennsylvania gradu-
ate, Society for Research in Chinese Architecture member, 
and prominent architectural thinker in China, published an 
article titled “On the Principal Characteristics of Chinese 
Architecture,” in which she argued that the kind of tectonic 
integrity suggested by imperial-era Chinese structures mir-
rored the principles of reinforced concrete and steel con-
struction evident in European modernism, a development 
that could be seen as having been stimulated by new, revolu-
tionary attitudes about modern life around the Continent. 
Lin reasoned that similar social and technological  phenomena 
might be triggered in China by more attentive study of tra-
ditional Chinese structural precedents and their adaptation 
to new building standards through modern construction 
materials.36 More generally, it was believed that stricter 
adherence to precise construction principles and structural 
ratios articulated by recently discovered Chinese building 
manuals such as the Yingzao fashi, written in 1103, might 
guide Chinese architects toward more accurate, if anachro-
nistic, variations of national architectural form.37 
Having witnessed the process by which the Golden 
Temple had become recast as an architectural spectacle by 
fair organizers and an American press eager to promote their 
own impressions of Chinese culture, the Chinese architect 
Guo struggled to reconcile China’s participation in light of 
the emergent architectural debate at home with respect to 
the modern movement, the nascent Chinese nation-state, 
and mounting geopolitical challenges to its existence, most 
notably from Japan. In August 1932, Japan confirmed its fair 
participation, despite hesitation to commit to an  exhibition 
organized in the United States, then the most vocal critic of 
Japanese imperialist strategy in Manchuria. In  February 
1933, despite condemnation from the League of Nations, 
Japan expanded its military presence into Jehol (Rehe) prov-
ince, site of the original Wanfuguiyi Hall and less than 
62 miles from Beijing. In Chicago, any mutual mistrust 
between Japan’s government representatives and fair officials 
was mollified by the eventual positioning of the Japanese 
pavilion within close proximity to the Bendix Temple, based 
upon the felt sense among American organizers of “aesthetic 
harmony” struck by the two buildings ( Figure 11).38 The deci-
sion prompted protest by Chinese officials, who pointed out 
that China’s weakened position in relation to Japan would 
only be emphasized by the Japanese pavilion’s adjacency to 
the Golden Temple. 
Details surfaced of an official Japanese pavilion that 
would resemble a Japanese village, around which would be 
grouped a theater, restaurants, and a teahouse employing 
“geisha girls” (Figure 12).39 There were also rumors of a 
 purported South Manchurian Railway display within the 
Japanese pavilion, though fair president Rufus Dawes reas-
sured Chinese and American officials that Japanese officials 
understood that “an invitation to Japan is not an invitation 
to Manchukuo.”40 Regardless, such brazen disregard for 
 Chinese sovereignty infuriated GMD officials, who could 
not understand why Japan had the right to display in its 
 official pavilion the products of “a neighboring territory 
which, with the exception of the present unlawful military 
territory by Japan, is still in every way part of China.”41 
Just days before the fair’s opening, Guo employed the 
temple to hasten the convergence of Chinese discourses on 
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Figure 11 Map, Century of Progress International Exposition, Chicago, 1933 (COP_16_0011_001_75_map, University of Illinois at Chicago Library, 
Special Collections).
Figure 12  Iwakichi Miyamoto, Japanese Pavilion, Chicago, 1933 (Allen D. Albert, Official View Book: A Century of Progress Exposition [Chicago: 
Reuben H. Donnelley Corporation, 1933]).
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modernism and nationalism, publishing an impassioned edi-
torial in the fair’s official newspaper that criticized the event’s 
aesthetics while declaring what he considered to be the 
 temple’s genuine architectural significance: 
One sober mind will find all the inspiration of this modern move-
ment directly or indirectly from ancient Chinese art and architec-
ture. The significant meaning of the structure, its principles of 
construction, the use of materials, and the creation of a piece 
of art embodying architecture, painting, and sculpture as an 
entirety will belittle any of the modern efforts to create a modern 
style. In my very humble opinion this Chinese temple and your 
own Fort Dearborn are more modern in their spirit than any other 
structure at this Century of Progress. … China has no money to 
expend just for effect or to cheat the eyes of people as you do 
when you suspend masonry upon your steel skyscrapers. This 
is what I call covering up the ribs.42 
Guo’s essay capitalized on one of the fair’s significant 
advantages, namely, its role as an international platform from 
which Chinese architectural ideas could be projected, to 
assert that certain structural principles intrinsic to the mod-
ern movement be recognized in traditional Chinese struc-
tures. As such, it represents the first attempt by a Chinese 
architect to insert himself into an architectural debate taking 
place far beyond China’s own shores. 
In commandeering the rhetoric of authenticity used 
by fair organizers to instead describe the temple as para-
doxically modern, Guo’s reductivism revealed the ways in 
which “traditional” China, like modern China, represented 
contested political idealizations both inside and outside 
the country. As an American-funded, Han Chinese– 
 constructed replica of a Tibetan Buddhist-inspired Man-
chu imperial complex now located in Japanese-controlled 
territory, the temple belied any nativist notions of a singu-
lar, idealized Chineseness. Yet in both his original, English 
language polemic and a subsequent Chinese recapitula-
tion of his argument published in 1934, Guo maintained 
that the temple should be seen as an aesthetic epitome of 
 Chinese architecture while exhorting readers to remain 
objectively aware of the benefits of, and limits posed by, 
international architectural dissemination itself. He high-
lighted this challenge by distinguishing the kind of modern 
architecture being espoused by European architects such 
as Le Corbusier from the movement’s gaudy distortion 
as it was celebrated in Chicago, without acknowledging 
his own complicity in the structure’s distortive staging.43 
Following the fair, such equivocality would reverberate 
throughout Chinese architectural discourse in a number of 
consequential ways.
The Chinese Pavilion
Over the course of 1932, and despite the Golden Temple’s 
official inclusion within the fair, China-based American 
 officials such as Judge Paul Linebarger, a longtime 
 American adviser to the Chinese National government in 
Nanjing, and Julean Arnold, a Department of Commerce 
envoy based in Shanghai, continued to press Chinese offi-
cials for a formal commitment to the fair while beginning 
to assert their own, specific visions for what a Chinese gov-
ernment–endorsed exhibit might look like. In a March 1932 
letter sent to  members of the State Council in Nanjing, for 
example,  Linebarger revealed his own imagined Chinese 
pavilion, which he thought should include: “A pagoda of 
Chinese materials by Chinese artisans, to contain office 
[space], 100 booths to be rented to overseas Chinese, a 
 theatre, restaurant, economic bureau for dissemination of 
information concerning China; a small Chinese walled city, 
within which would be Chinese art, weaving, porcelain 
manufacturing, lapidary art work, silversmith work, food 
products, linen and silk work, etc.; and a reproduction of 
Willow Tea House in Shanghai.”44 Despite the specificity 
of these suggestions, American fair organizers continued 
to insist China was free to erect any type of structure they 
wanted, provided it was “thoroughly typical of the partici-
pating country.”45 
Internal conflict between the fair’s promotional staff and 
its architectural commission produced additional contradic-
tory guidelines concerning Chinese architectural participa-
tion. Following the selection of a pavilion site due south of 
the temple’s location along the fair’s lagoon just east of the 
Twenty-Third Street entrance, for example, Chinese repre-
sentatives were informed by the fair’s architectural com-
mission that it would only accept a Chinese design on the 
condition that it was a satisfying example of “modern  Chinese 
architecture.”46 Chinese officials thus found themselves 
caught between competing conceptions of a suitable Chinese 
architectural statement at the fair. The event’s architectural 
commission was interested in a building closely aligned with 
their vision of American modernism. The US- and China-
based American fair organizers mainly responsible for the 
event’s finances and logistics hoped for an overtly Chinese 
pavilion that, like the Golden Temple, would superficially 
reinforce American cultural presumptions with respect to 
China, attracting crowds and earning revenue in the process. 
And Chinese officials themselves desired a structure capable 
of promoting Republican China’s industrial and commercial 
modernization while calling attention to the uniqueness of 
traditional Chinese architecture and, by extension, China’s 
increasingly imperiled autonomy.
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At the same time, China’s own proposed pavilion at 
 Chicago presaged an important shift in modern Chinese 
architectural expression; namely, the search for forms that 
could tackle the compositional and material challenges of 
new international architectural trends beyond those evoked 
in the syncretic Beaux-Arts-inspired building agenda back 
home. In June 1932, an official Chinese Fair Participation 
Commission, comprising a handful of government officials 
drawn from the Ministry of Industries as well as several 
 members of the Shanghai-based Chinese Society of Architects, 
was established in Shanghai. Henry Murphy (1877–1954), 
a Shanghai-based American architect and longtime consul-
tant to the Republican government, was retained as an infor-
mal exhibition adviser.47 
American officials were relieved to know of Murphy’s 
participation, indicating a fundamental lack of faith in China’s 
ability to represent itself in accordance with American expec-
tations. His scheme, the drawings for which were completed 
by August 1932, derived its inspiration from the layout of a 
Chinese gentleman’s courtyard home and was composed of 
three 625-square-foot courtyards, each containing a garden, 
pool, and decorative rockery and ringed by a 6-foot-wide 
promenade (Figures 13 and 14). Two two-story buildings 
were placed between each courtyard, helping to delineate 
them while offering vantage points from which the entire 
pavilion could be admired. A series of adjoining rooms posi-
tioned around each courtyard would feature exhibits of 
 Chinese paintings, sculpture, textiles, and bronzes. Conces-
sions for the sale of Chinese goods were located just north 
and south of the pavilion’s main courtyard nucleus, with an 
open-air theater for acrobatic routines and a tea garden res-
taurant located slightly east near the lagoon. 
In consultations with Albert and Arnold, Murphy agreed 
that the pavilion would need to be as financially “self- 
supporting” as possible.48 The site was designed, first and 
foremost, to attract visitors. Like the Bendix Golden Temple, 
its ultimate success was to be based not upon any degree of 
architectural ingenuity or structural quality but upon its 
eventual financial solvency. Murphy adopted an ostensibly 
“Chinese” linear composition, with a series of 8-foot-wide 
small alleys converging on three centrally located courtyards 
in an effort to re-create the “crowded streets of old Canton 
with Chinese sign-banners overhead.” An energetic, bustling 
collection of salespeople would lure visitors into Murphy’s 
designed compound through an ornamental gateway, or pailou, 
while Chinese artisans could be employed to sit in the open-
front shops and make their wares in full view of the public. 
In his adherence to the strict orthogonal nature of the classic 
Chinese courtyard, Murphy failed to maximize the site’s full 
spatial allotment, offering instead a phenomenologically 
based, exoticized emblem of China repackaged from his own 
personal experiences for a Chicago audience. 
Although both American and Chinese fair representatives 
seemed satisfied with Murphy’s proposal, a subsequent shift 
in the position of the Chinese pavilion site due to new road 
construction prompted the scheme’s revision. In  October, the 
Chinese Fair Participation Committee formally delegated 
responsibility for the pavilion’s design to the Society of Chinese 
Architects itself.49 Within the society’s ranks, an emergent 
younger generation of Chinese architects had begun to seek 
out alternatives to Beaux-Arts-design-based models, and the 
responsibility for the pavilion’s design was subsequently 
entrusted to three key representatives of this generation–– 
Xu Jingzhi (1906–83), Tong Jun (1900–1983), and Wu Jingqi 
(1900–1943).50 
Though none of the three architects were formally 
trained in modernist design principles, their educational and 
professional backgrounds reveal shared experiences: educated 
in the United States, exposed to design trends in Europe, direct 
professional engagement with several prominent foreign 
American-based architects, and a professed desire to chart 
a new course in modern Chinese architecture.51 The group’s 
senior member, Tong, had graduated from the University of 
Pennsylvania to take a position as a lecturer and founding 
faculty member of China’s first Beaux-Arts architectural 
degree program at Northeast University. Tong’s early lec-
tures distinguished China’s own modern architectural his-
tory, which he traced from origins in the country’s first treaty 
ports, to the new kind of modernism he had likely experi-
enced in Europe on a study tour in 1928, characterized as an 
“organism” unrestrained by the stylistic limits of “classicism” 
or “national boundary” but closely attuned to modern society.52 
Like a number of his contemporaries, Tong predicted the 
risk involved in the continued creep of international archi-
tectural conformity. He urged students and practitioners 
alike to acquaint themselves with Western architectural his-
tory and modern building principles while actively engaging 
in the study of China’s structural systems, in the hope that 
potential points of commonality might be identified that 
would ensure the preservation of some trace of Chinese 
 cultural specificity within this new, evolving stage of modern 
architecture. 
Xu, a Guangdong native who graduated from the 
 University of Michigan’s architecture department in 1930, 
was equally interested in mediating perceived gaps between 
Chinese architectural form and modernism. In May 1931, 
and following his completion of a one-year scholarship from 
Cranbrook Academy to study under Eliel Saarinen, Xu 
thanked the institution’s director of art education, Frank E. 
Allen, for allowing him to freely explore “the possibilities of 
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Figure 13  Henry Murphy, Chinese Pavilion (proposed), Chicago, August 1932 (COP_02_0052_009_37_001, University of Illinois at Chicago Library, 
Special Collections).
s ituat ing  Ch inese  arCh iteCture  w ith in  “a  Century  of  progress”     361
modernizing Chinese Architecture according to true tradi-
tions, [the] needs of scientific and hygienic ways of living, 
and modern methods of construction.”53 Following an archi-
tectural tour of Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia 
funded by Cranbrook founders George and Ellen Booth, 
Xu returned to China in early 1932, where he began work 
as a draftsman in Shanghai under the Penn-trained Fan 
Wenzhao. Wu, meanwhile, graduated from the University 
of Pennsylvania in 1931 and spent ten months working for 
Adin Benedict Lacy in the United States before returning to 
China to join Fan’s Shanghai office in mid-1932.
The group’s pavilion proposal encapsulated a number 
of emergent Chinese ideas with respect to European modern-
ism, the tempered American interpretation of European 
 modernism on display at the fair, and the possibilities both 
offered to contemporary, state-sanctioned Republican archi-
tecture. As such, the project captures an important transitional 
moment in which some Republican-era Chinese architects, 
increasingly aware of the contradictory promotion of politi-
cally and socially progressive ideals through an essentially 
imperial-era Chinese aesthetic, began to eschew the more 
elaborate decorative and formal modalities of the state’s build-
ing program in favor of a more simplified, tectonic architec-
tural expression (Figures 15 and 16). It also echoed the broad 
range of experimentation with modern design principles 
occurring throughout much of the world at the time.54 
Consisting of a series of abstracted courtyards separated 
by stark, unadorned walls, and topped by elements of tradi-
tional Chinese design, the pavilion had four major components: 
a government exhibition center, a commercial  concession 
space, a public theater, and a large, multistory restaurant and 
entertainment center. Visitors approaching from the recon-
figured Twenty-Third Street Plaza would enter through a 
ceremonial pailou demarcating a “Court of Honor,” punctu-
ated by two flagpoles flying Republican  Chinese colors. 
Bound on the north by the government’s exhibit and to the 
south by the pavilion’s main concessionary space, the court 
offered an intermediate area of spatial and cultural conver-
gence through which fairgoers could pass from the busy 
 public thoroughfare into the more private compound. Within 
Figure 14  Henry Murphy, Chinese Pavilion (proposed), Chicago, August 1932 (COP_02_0052_009_37_003, University of Illinois at Chicago 
Library, Special Collections).
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Figure 15  Tong Jun, Xu Jingzhi, and Wu Jingqi, Chinese Society of Architects, Chinese Pavilion (proposed), Chicago, 1933 (Kaufmann & Fabry Co., 
Chicago [photographer], ca. 1932. HALIC, Ryerson and Burnham Archives, Art Institute of Chicago. Digital File #42655 copyright Art Institute of 
Chicago).
Figure 16  Tong Jun, Xu Jingzhi, and 
Wu Jingqi, Chinese Society of Architects, 
Chinese Pavilion (proposed), Chicago, 1933 
(Shenbao, 21 Feb. 1933).
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the compound, concession space was molded into two cell-like 
clusters of product booths. The smaller grouping, topped 
with a curvilinear Chinese roof, was intended for theatrical 
performances, while the larger space, centered upon a small 
pavilion, was segmented into quadrants. Product booths, 
open to entrance from either side, were constructed on a 
series of terraces that cascaded down to the water’s edge, 
where they abutted the proposed multistory restaurant com-
plex configured as a traditional Tibetan palace. To the east 
lay the fair’s North Lagoon and Lake Michigan.
In muting its own use of elaborate but often historically 
inaccurate application of Chinese ornamental precedent on 
display in ongoing Chinese government projects in both 
Nanjing and Shanghai, the proposal unmasked the conflicts 
at work in the Republican government’s nationalist agenda 
and the oscillating architectural and political sensibilities of 
China’s architectural community. Chinese ornamental 
details were restricted to key identifiable symbols such as the 
pailou and Chinese roof, giving the pavilion a stripped-down 
functionalist aesthetic. As opposed to adhering to a tradi-
tional Chinese courtyard layout and its cardinal directional-
ity (as had Murphy’s more conservative scheme), the team 
creatively maximized the full dimensions of the site by rein-
terpreting the spatial conceit of the courtyard as a more gen-
eral organizing mechanism around which shops and 
exhibition booths could be positioned. The juxtaposition of 
relatively minimal Chinese architectural precedent atop the 
flat-roofed structure’s otherwise unadorned concrete form 
speaks directly to the extent to which Xu, Tong, and Wu 
were willing to experiment with both the functionalism and 
materiality of modernist design. Presented to China’s Fair 
Participation Committee in January 1933, a final model, 
plan, and accompanying review were eventually published 
in Shenbao, Shanghai’s most prominent Chinese newspaper, 
on 21 February, where it was hailed as a successful negotia-
tion between “beauty” and “economy” that “evoked China’s 
traditional architectural style while simultaneously offering 
a hint of Western architectural culture.”55 
While the public promotion of the pavilion in the winter 
of 1933 coincided with news of the Museum of Modern Art’s 
“International Style” exhibition,56 China’s more active 
involvement in Chicago’s fair arguably positioned this event 
as the more immediately and tangibly influential force in 
China’s subsequent architectural development. The fair 
prompted an architectural mediation between the divergent 
representations of technological change inside and outside 
China stipulated by the fair and the Republican government’s 
continued reliance upon Beaux-Arts design principles to spur 
economic and social modernization. The simultaneous pro-
motion and parsing of both events in the Chinese media 
began to fuel debate with respect to the relative merits of 
European modernism and American modern architecture in 
connection to China’s own building conditions. With only a 
handful of China’s most prominent young architects able to 
travel to Europe and the United States, the unidirectional 
dissemination of the “International Style” exhibition limited 
Chinese architects to merely reading about, reacting to, 
and adapting the style in China. The Chinese Chicago Fair 
pavilion, by contrast, represented a more dialogic and parti-
cipatory encounter.57 It provided young architects like Guo, 
Xu, Wu, and Tong with unique exposure to an international 
audience, facilitated the transmission of numerous innova-
tive architectural trends to China, and, in so doing, began to 
prompt important questions concerning the continued effi-
cacy of the nationalist building agenda. 
China’s Second Pavilion Scheme
Over the spring of 1933, the society’s pavilion scheme slowly 
buckled under the external pressures of the international 
exposition as well as the internal burdens imposed by an 
embattled GMD leadership. Tong, Xu, and Wu’s society-
supported Chinese pavilion proposal was met with disap-
pointment on the part of American officials such as Arnold, 
Albert, and Linebarger, all of whom preferred Murphy’s 
 proposal.58 Arnold, for example, found the Chinese archi-
tects’ project a failed attempt to capture “the really beautiful, 
artistic, and unique in Chinese architecture” through the 
unfortunate and overeager “compromise” it struck between 
Chinese and foreign architecture:
Chinese architects are so keen on showing their ability to make 
something foreign or Western that they are inclined to discount 
the beauty or originality of Chinese architecture and things 
 Chinese. In other words, most of the Chinese architects appear 
to prefer to be second or third rate Western style architects 
rather than first class Chinese architects. … While we all under-
stand why this should be so, we wish it were not thus. Further-
more, I imagine that many Chinese believe that any imitation of 
Western ideas would give them the credit among westerns of 
being more modern, whereas were they to put things up in 
Chinese style they might be accused of being medieval and the 
country rated accordingly. In other words, China in transition is 
something like an awkward, fast-growing youth whose hands 
and feet are out of all proportion to the rest of his body, and who 
has not yet learned how to handle them gracefully.59
Asserting America’s own cultural and technological ascen-
dance in comparison to Europe’s demanded the relegation of 
Republican China to the fitful, liminal stage of adolescence, 
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despite the fact that its struggles with modernism paralleled 
America’s own conflicted relationship with the phenomenon. 
More than exposing the organizational hierarchies at work 
in the fair, however, Arnold also revealed a lack of consensus 
among fair organizers concerning China’s stage of cultural 
development as gauged in architectural terms. The Golden 
Temple, for example, was being concurrently promoted as char-
acteristic of China’s timeless cultural traditions, making the 
country both precociously young and impossibly old. 
Ultimately, it was Murphy’s designs, representing the 
work of an obscure Western architect who had achieved 
unlikely fame in China, that fair organizers lauded as 
embodying “true” Chinese architecture. Neither they nor 
the Chinese government ever fully subscribed to the 
 Tong-Xu-Wu proposal. The initial impulse to consult with 
Murphy suggests some unknown disagreement over the 
 Chinese proposal, a lingering cachet held by foreign experts 
within a still-modernizing China, and a calculated desire to 
maximize China’s commercial engagement with an American 
audience. Moreover, the political vacuum created by the 
 significant diminution of GMD authority throughout the 
country had unduly complicated the ongoing Chinese pavil-
ion design process as well as the organization and collection 
of provincial goods for display. In January 1933, Chinese 
officials reassured fair representatives that “delay is a Chinese 
virtue,” while reporting that exhibition materials were being 
collected and, with the assistance of Arnold, would be publi-
cally displayed in Shanghai for two weeks before being deliv-
ered to Chicago along with final blueprints for the pavilion.60 
With less than five months before the opening of the fair, 
however, organizers had yet to receive any final confirmation 
regarding the Chinese pavilion or its contents, leaving the 
country’s architectural representation in flux. 
On 18 February 1933, China’s Fair Participation Com-
mittee sponsored a massive public exhibition attended by at 
least 500 people in Shanghai devoted to private and public 
solicitations for the Chinese pavilion. This was followed by 
a display selection subcommittee organizational meeting 
headed by Chiang Kai-shek adversary Chen Gongbo, who, 
in his capacity as China’s minister of industry, had been made 
responsible for coordinating China’s commercial and indus-
trial display in Chicago. Less than two weeks later, on 
2 March, and under orders purportedly from Chiang, the 
Chinese government formally and abruptly withdrew its 
financial support for the fair.61 
Under the pretext of China’s ongoing conflict with 
Japan, the surprising reversal not to fund China’s participation 
was purportedly urged by T. V. Soong, then vice director of 
Nanjing’s Executive Yuan Committee and a staunch Chiang 
ally, who feared Chen and his leftist faction, led by the 
Republican government’s erstwhile premier Wang Jingwei, 
would use the government’s financial support not to promote 
the fruits of the Republican party’s modernizing efforts 
abroad, but rather to further undermine Chiang’s political 
legitimacy and gain influence for themselves among the 
wealthier and more politically active members of America’s 
Chinese diaspora.62 
No longer supported by the government in Nanjing, a 
team of provincial representatives quickly banded together 
along with the Shanghai Exhibitors Association to coordinate 
China’s representation in Chicago:
Again the uncertainty from the Chinese National Government 
makes us propose a constructive plan––a plan with all the 
 cooperation, confidences and trust from these various merchants— 
it can’t fail and it won’t fail. These merchants under the leader-
ship of the writer are willing to cooperate and construct a 
pavilion, half the size of the proposed Chinese government lot, 
at their expense, to represent the Chinese Government partici-
pation. The plan composes a reservation for the Chinese Gov-
ernment exhibit, a Chinese Theatre (marionette), a Tea Garden, 
Chinese Merchandise Bazaar, and Chinese stores for various 
merchants. … This proposed construction will cost approxi-
mately $35,000 dollars.63
Although the association expressed interest in adapting 
the society’s original scheme to fit their budgetary restric-
tions, subsequent conversations between the architect 
Guo, now placed in charge of facilitating China’s “unoffi-
cial” architectural participation in Chicago by the Shanghai 
Exhibitors Association, and local Chicago-based contrac-
tors necessitated further reductions in the pavilion’s final 
cost. 
At the same time, and seemingly unbeknown to the 
Shanghai Exhibitors Association, Murphy was again 
approached by Arnold and asked to revise his original scheme 
to accommodate available funding. It was reimagined to 
include a smaller compound, surrounded by a 170-foot wall, 
20 feet high and topped with parapets and a central gate 
tower, within which could be constructed an open-air acro-
batic theater, exhibition space, restaurant, and tea garden, 
surrounded by a series of one-story structures for Chinese 
merchants and their respective wares (Figure 17). Arnold and 
Albert, pleased to see the inclusion of a “Chinese city wall” 
in the scheme, approved it immediately.64 With Murphy 
unable to leave Shanghai to supervise the pavilion’s construc-
tion, however, the new plans were handed over to Guo, who 
subsequently collaborated with Paul F. Mueller, an American 
engineer previously known for his work on Frank Lloyd 
Wright’s Imperial Hotel in Tokyo, to develop a scaled-down 
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pavilion based upon both Murphy’s and the Tong-Wu-Xu 
proposal. 
The Shanghai Exhibitors Association could only 
offer a $15,000 donation for the pavilion’s construction, 
however, which was too small to realize either Murphy’s or 
the Tong-Wu-Xu scheme in their entirety. Nor was China’s 
original official position along the lagoon still available. 
As a result, the exhibitors association was allotted a new loca-
tion adjoining both the Golden Temple and the Japanese 
pavilion. By 29 April 1933, a low-lying Chinese Beijing-style 
courtyard compound constructed by Daniel H. Burnham Jr. 
and Hubert Burnham’s firm, Burnham Brothers, was “ rapidly 
rising” in the shadow of the Golden Temple.65 The com-
pound, eventually completed at less than one-eighth of its 
originally intended size, consisted of two major display halls 
linked by a covered walkway, in the center of which was 
 positioned an open-air courtyard. Topped with a series of 
ornamental Chinese roofs, the building’s architecture itself 
was eclipsed not only by both the Japanese pavilion and the 
adjacent Golden Temple but also by its own elaborate inte-
rior display, which featured a dazzling collection of Chinese 
imperial porcelain, silk, embroidery, and painting collected 
from exhibition committees in Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangxi, 
and Jiangsu.66 
Figure 17  Henry Murphy, Chinese Pavilion (proposed), Chicago, 1933 (COP_02_0052_009_37_002, University of Illinois at Chicago Library, 
Special Collections).
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The Fair, Modern Architecture, and China
Despite the complications involved in their respective con-
structions, both the Chinese pavilion and the Bendix Golden 
Temple immediately signaled critical, new coordinates 
within a broadened conceptual map of twentieth-century 
Chinese architectural discourse and design. A two-page 
spread on the fair published in Shenbao in July 1933 revealed 
the extent to which Chinese architects were actively engaged 
with contemporary architectural discourse as framed by the 
fair, while equally aware of its obvious curatorial shortcom-
ings, particularly in light of China’s ongoing political crisis. 
One article, for example, lamented the event’s missed oppor-
tunity to disseminate true architectural modernism by omit-
ting figures like Le Corbusier, Frank Lloyd Wright, and the 
Saarinens in Chicago, echoing similar comments from Ralph 
Adams Cram, Buckminster Fuller, and Wright himself. 
Another noted the Golden Temple’s ironic presence on full 
display for American audiences, while the original building 
remained inaccessible to Chinese citizens due to the Japanese 
occupation of Jehol (Rehe) province.67 
Although Chicago initially seemed to offer an ideal venue 
to showcase a singularly modern architectural embodiment 
of early twentieth-century China, the eventual circumstances 
surrounding the country’s participation conspired to produce 
a compromised but ultimately more revealing vision of the 
disparate, transnational forces responsible for the country’s 
modern architectural representation. Zhou Zhijun, a 
 Qingdao-based industrialist traveling through Chicago as 
part of a tour of industrial manufacturing practices around 
the world, found the Chinese pavilion an “unimpressive 
reflection of China’s architectural splendor,” though he 
acknowledged the tremendous obstacles the building had 
faced over the course of its construction, including the 
speed with which it had to be completed as well as its budget 
constraints.68 The involvement of Chicago-based Chinese 
diaspora in some aspects of the pavilion’s marketing, mean-
while, evinced the power of China’s overseas communities in 
shaping impressions of Chinese architecture outside China. 
One overseas Chinese commentator urged Republican lead-
ers to continue to cooperate with Western powers such as the 
United States despite the professional and cultural imbal-
ances such interactions posed.69 
China’s exhibition debacle at the Chicago Fair also 
reminds us of the extent to which modern Chinese cultural 
identity was forged through feelings of inadequacy, shame, 
and failure, often triggered by transnational engagement.70 
Growing frustration with China’s architectural shortcomings 
and the role played by foreign advisers led to the gradual 
reconfiguration of China’s architectural discipline and 
discourse. Chinese architects increasingly saw the privileging 
of figures like Murphy and their presumed cosmopolitan 
value as unduly restrictive of the country’s own architectural 
culture. Writing in direct reference to Murphy, for example, 
an aggrieved Liang Sicheng declared in a 1934 editorial that 
a general lack of basic Chinese language skills or any com-
prehensive understanding of Chinese history meant that 
“every foreigner talking about Chinese architecture is way 
off the mark.”71 Yet Chinese architects, many of whom were 
students and employees of foreign architects, also bore 
responsibility for perpetuating essentialized notions of 
authenticity in relation to Chinese architecture, a point 
underscored by China’s frustrating experience in Chicago. 
In amplifying these representational inadequacies, the 
fair helped to open a potential rift between the country’s 
architectural community and GMD officials. Tension not 
only stemmed from the government’s failure to support the 
Chinese pavilion financially but also resulted from confusion 
over the purported aims of the country’s national building 
program. Upon visiting the fairgrounds just prior to its grand 
opening, for example, China’s finance minister, T. V. Soong, 
had declared his satisfaction with China’s completed exhibit 
and what it revealed to American visitors about “modern 
China.”72 For a Republican government desperate to ensure 
the state’s survival at any cost, well-intentioned efforts on 
the part of Chinese architects to position Chinese architec-
ture within a new transcultural architectural idiom proved 
increasingly irrelevant and unnecessary. China’s mere 
involvement in a fair devoted to global technological advance-
ment was enough to support the government’s ideological 
program regardless of what architectural form its participa-
tion ultimately took. 
Upon his return home from Chicago, Guo offered a 
very different perspective on the completed pavilion itself, 
the government’s failure to provide adequate funding, and its 
impact upon China’s involvement, which he described as 
both “incomplete” and “unsatisfying.”73 In a polite rebuttal 
published one year after the fair’s opening, the head of the 
Shanghai Exhibitors Association’s department of design 
and display, Zhang Xianglin, countered Guo’s claims. 
He acknowledged that although the Chinese pavilion had 
experienced a series of “twists and turns” because of financial 
restrictions, the final results had proved to be “an exquisite 
and clever Asian-inflected architecture,” intimating that 
Guo’s disappointment with the project’s eventual financial 
resources was both ungracious and unwarranted.74 
Professional debate over China’s architectural represen-
tation and the potential repercussions for modern Chinese 
sovereignty gave rise to a new, more vocal plurality of per-
spectives within China’s architectural community concerning 
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what modern Chinese architecture, and by extension, 
 modern China, might look like. The events in Chicago did 
not lead to the profession’s complete disavowal of the ideo-
logical exigencies of the Republican state, but they heralded 
a fragmentation of architectural design methodologies 
in China after 1933. They also predicated a development 
indicative of modernism’s growing appeal in China, growing 
dissatisfaction on the part of some Chinese architects with 
the government’s conservative building program, and a 
 process within which China’s architectural participants in 
 Chicago played crucial roles. 
Following the closing of the fair in November 1933, 
a select group of China’s architectural avant-garde, led 
by both active and tangential fair participants like Guo, 
Tong, Xu, and Wu, set about refining the future trajectory of 
Chinese architectural design based, in part, on their experi-
ence with the Chicago Fair.75 A provocative  layout in the 
January 1934 issue of Chinese Architecture, for example, inter-
posed images of the fair’s modern buildings with the Golden 
Temple, reinforcing Guo’s earlier polemic concerning its con-
ceptual status as a precursor to the structural rationalism of 
“modern” architecture and suggesting future avenues for 
design experimentation. In February, a Shenbao article titled 
“The Relationship between Traditional Chinese Architec-
ture and Modern Architecture” posited the characteristics of 
spatial simplicity, the use of color, and the shared verticality 
of pagodas and skyscrapers as additional potential junctures 
between contemporary architectural design and China’s 
indigenous building traditions. Guo  himself used images 
taken of the fair’s prefabricated housing units to advocate 
for China’s own embrace of the technology in improving the 
country’s housing conditions.76 
A 1936 article coauthored by Wu mapped the emergence 
of three distinct design strategies in China, the roots of 
which extended back to China’s architectural antecedents on 
display in Chicago. The first, known as “a return to tradition,” 
or fugu pai, represented a call for a greater understanding 
of imperial Chinese architecture prior to the anticipated 
future experimentation advocated by figures like Liang. This 
approach recognized the inherent contradictions at work in 
the transnational claims made by both international exhibi-
tionary and modernist praxes. This position was exemplified 
by Xu’s own winning proposal for the Nanjing Capital 
Museum, which relied extensively on strict Liao- and Song-era 
architectural ratios and proportions, evoking the mimetic 
attention to China’s architectural past evidenced in the 
Golden Temple’s reconstruction. His design seemed to 
emphasize the overarching significance of cultural national-
ism at the expense of any particularly modernist, socially 
progressive agenda.77 
Qiuxin pai, or “the search for the new,” represented a 
more substantive engagement with architectural modernism 
and eventually was embraced by figures like Fan Wenzhao, 
Guo, and Tong. In June 1934, for example, a Guo-penned 
article lamented the superficial application of Chinese orna-
ment to otherwise utilitarian structures like factories, shops, 
and public-housing projects in favor of more economic, 
rational means of expression.78 Tong urged the same approach, 
refining his own early experimentations in the Chinese 
 pavilion scheme in the process (Figure 18). In a famous 1937 
Figure 18  Tong Jun, Public Office 
Building (proposed), Nanjing, 1937 (Tong 
Ming, ed., Tong Jun wenji, vol. 2 [Beijing: 
Zhongguo jianzhu gongye chubanshe, 
2001]; courtesy Tong Ming).
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polemic, he exhorted Chinese architects to reconcile them-
selves to the flat roof, declaring that “the temple roof definitely 
has had its day. At present, classical Chinese architecture has 
nothing to offer to the modern building except surface orna-
mentation, and as the enduring and sublime qualities in 
architecture rest with structural values alone, it requires little 
imagination to foresee the rapid and universal adoption of 
the international (or modernistic) style in steel and con-
crete.”79 Although this faction’s predilection for the formal 
aspects of modernism may have implied a rejection of the 
Republican government, Guo and Tong, like Xu, went on to 
write modern histories of Chinese architecture that attempted 
to reconcile the modern principles with traditional Chinese 
building practices.80 
The third strategy, zhezhong pai, a “compromise” of archi-
tectural eclecticism advocated by Wu, represented the most 
politically palatable option.81 It argued for an amalgamation 
of modern materials and Chinese ornament not unlike  earlier 
fusions of Beaux-Arts and Chinese architectural traditions. 
Like the Chinese pavilion scheme itself, its hybridity sought 
to honor the culturally nationalistic basis of GMD authority 
without completely reconciling the impact of international 
engagement in producing a uniquely Chinese expression of 
modernity. 
Collectively, these three positions would continue to 
define the theoretical parameters of China’s architectural dis-
course until the Japanese invasion of Shanghai on 7 July 1937.
Conclusion
The Chinese pavilion and the Bendix Golden Temple in 
Chicago represented a moment of discontinuity in what is 
typically characterized as an uninterrupted decade of Beaux-
Arts-inspired civic architectural progression in China. They 
helped to push the scope of modern Chinese architecture 
well beyond the physical boundaries of China itself. In so 
doing, they revealed the empowering and restrictive aspects 
of political and cultural systems both inside and outside the 
country within which China’s architects struggled to operate. 
Both structures offered much more than a didactic overview 
of an emergent nation-state’s failed attempt to realize an 
architectural idiom at once both undeniably modern and yet 
historically familiar. The inability to effectively define modern 
Chinese architecture in Chicago exposed the problematic 
roots of the search itself. Chinese attempts to design a pavil-
ion that aligned the professed social and technocratic bene-
fits of the modern movement with their country’s own 
cultural nationalistic agenda were limited not only by fair 
organizers eager to validate their own antiquated vision of 
China for financial and professional gain or a Republican 
government whose ideological aspirations could not accom-
modate aesthetic alternatives, but by deep-seated profes-
sional ambivalence concerning the Chinese architect’s 
relationship to foreign-imposed notions of modernity. The 
Bendix Golden Temple, meanwhile, fulfilled exhibitionary 
expectations and nationalistic narratives by celebrating the 
country’s rich, preexisting architectural heritage without 
truly acknowledging its contested origins or uncertain future. 
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